

Seminar "Aktuelle Fragen der Mikroökonomie"

Das Seminar wird sich mit unterschiedlichen Ansätzen der Prinzipal-Agent-Literatur befassen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt hierbei auf dem Problem "Moralischen Risikos" und Anreizsystemen, um diesem Problem zu begegnen. Eine informelle Einführung in die Thematik bietet

Sappington, D., 1991. Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(2), pp. 45-66. (www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1942685.pdf)

Themen:

Folgende Artikel sind zur Bearbeitung vorgesehen:¹

1. Holmström, B., 1979. Moral hazard and observability. *The Bell Journal of Economics* 10(1), pp. 74-91.
2. Sappington, D., 1983. Limited liability contracts between principal and agent. *Journal of Economic Theory* 29(1), pp. 1-21.
3. Holmström, B., 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams. *The Bell Journal of Economics* 13(2), 324-340.
4. Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K., 1992. Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence. *Journal of Political Economy* 100(3), pp. 468-505.
5. Hart, O.D., 1983. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme. *Bell Journal of Economics* 14(2), pp. 366-382.
6. Hermalin, B.E., 1992. The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior. *RAND Journal of Economics* 23(3), pp. 350-365.
7. Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P., 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 7, 24.52.
8. Laux, C. (2001). Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects. *RAND Journal of Economics* 32(3).
9. Aghion, P. and Tirole, J., 1997. Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. *The Journal of Political Economy* 105(1), pp. 1-29.
10. Bester, H. and Krähmer, 2008. Delegation and Incentives. *RAND Journal of Economics* 39(3), 664-682.

¹ Siehe z.B. www.jstor.org oder www.sciencedirect.com innerhalb des FU-Netzwerks