Robin Boadway


Robin Boadway zu Gast am Lehrstuhl Schöb

Dreiteilige Vortragsreihe


Selected Issues in Tax Design and Policy

The first two lectures will cover diverse topics on tax reform and tax design. These topics illustrate a number of problems facing tax policy analysis, such as asymmetric information, commitment and heterogeneity of households. The specific topics are Natural Resource Taxation, Wealth Transfer Taxation, Tax Design in LDCs, Entrepreneurship, Non-Cooperative Mechanisms for Global Public Goods and Externalities.

1. Vorlesung:

Montag, 08. Juni 2009, 14:15 – 15:45 Uhr, Kaminzimmer, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195 Berlin

Paper zur ersten Vorlesung

2. Vorlesung:

Dienstag, 09. Juni 2009, 14:15 – 15:45 Uhr, Hörsaal 104a, Garystr. 21, 14195 Berlin


The Efficiency of Pollution Abatement when Countries can Commit

Robin Boadway characterizes a mechanism for reducing pollution emissions in which countries, acting non-cooperatively, commit to match each others’ abatement levels and may subsequently engage in emissions quota trading. His analysis shows that the mechanism leads to efficient outcomes. The level of emissions is efficient, and if the matching abatements process includes a quota trading stage, the marginal benefits of emissions are also equalized across countries. Given the equilibrium matching rates, the initial allocation of emission quotas (before trading) reflects each country’s marginal valuation for lower pollution relative to its marginal benefit from emissions. These results hold for any number of countries, in an environment where countries have different abatement technologies and different benefits from emissions, and even if the emissions of countries are imperfect substitutes in each country’s damage function. In a dynamic two-period setting, the mechanism achieves both intra-temporal and inter-temporal efficiency. Robin Boadway extends the model by assuming that countries are voluntarily contributing to an international public good, in addition to undertaking pollution abatements, and finds that the level of emissions may be efficient even without any matching abatement commitments, and the marginal benefits of emissions may be equalized across countries even without quota trading.

3. Vorlesung:

Mittwoch, 10. Juni 2009, 18:00 – 19:30 Uhr, Kaminzimmer, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195 Berlin

Paper zur dritten Vorlesung