

# Do Tax Cuts Increase Consumption?

An Experimental Test of Ricardian Equivalence  
 (FU Berlin Discussion Paper No. 2014/16)

Theory	Findings																																																		
<p>A dynamic stochastic optimization model for 25 periods</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Induced time-separable CARA utility: <math>u(c_t) = 338[1 - e^{-0.0125c_t}]</math></li> <li>Dynamic optimization                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><math>\max_{c_t} E_t \sum_{j=0}^{25-t} u(c_{t+j})</math></li> </ul> </li> <li>Transition equation: s. t. <math>c_t + a_{t+1} + \tau_t = y_t + a_t</math></li> <li>Stochastic exogenous i.i.d. (labor) income <math>y_t</math> 120 or 250 Taler with equal probability in each period; standard deviation <math>\sigma_y = 65</math></li> <li>Initial/finite lifetime condition: <math>a_1 = 1000</math> Taler, <math>a_{26} = 0</math> Taler</li> <li>Constant sum of Taxes condition: <math>\sum_{t=1}^{25} \tau_t = 3000</math> Taler</li> </ul> <p>Definition: <i>Ricardian Equivalence</i>. Suppose the sum of all tax payments is certain and constant over the life-cycle, then the timing and the size of tax payments is irrelevant for optimal consumption.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consumers do not behave as predicted by expected utility theory                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>overreact to income changes</li> <li>difficulties in assessing magnitudes</li> <li>social norm that deems parsimony as a good thing</li> </ul> </li> <li>Over the life cycle, a tax relief increases consumption on average by about 22% of the tax rebate</li> <li>A tax increase causes consumption to decrease by about 30% of the tax increase</li> <li>In our experiment, we find the behavior of about 62% of our subjects to be inconsistent with the Ricardian proposition</li> <li>Taxation influences consumption beyond the current period</li> </ol>																																																		
<h2>Experimental Design</h2> <p><b>Control:</b>                  Taxes are 25 times 120, no tax cuts, no increases                  In the following two treatments: Tax cuts in early periods, tax increases after period 16                  There are 3 tax cuts and 3 tax increases; each of them are always 120 Taler                  Subjects are informed that the sum of taxes equals 3000 Taler over one life cycle</p> <p><b>Treatment Ricardian 1:</b>                  Tax cuts (increases) occur only if low (high) income shock                  Net income is pre-smoothed</p> <p><b>Treatment Ricardian 2:</b>                  Tax cuts (increases) occur only if high (low) income shock                  Net income is more volatile</p> <p>Optimal consumption is the same across all treatments                  Subjects play either the Control, Ricardian 1 or Ricardian 2 (random selection, about 43 subjects per treatment)</p>	<h2>Structural Panel Regression</h2> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Optimal consumption is a linear function in each period</li> <li>We weight income <math>\tilde{y}</math>, assets <math>\tilde{a}</math>, taxes to be paid <math>\tilde{T}</math>, precautionary saving <math>\tilde{\Gamma}(\theta\sigma_y)</math>, permanent income <math>\tilde{y}_p</math> such that theory predicts coefficients of these variables to be equal to one</li> <li>Theory predicts coefficients on tax dummies and lagged tax dummies to be zero</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Using Fixed Effects all weighted variables are significantly different from one</li> <li>Tax cut dummies are positive and significantly different from zero</li> <li>Tax increase dummies are negative and significantly different from zero</li> <li>Some lagged tax dummies are statistically different from zero</li> </ol> <table border="1" data-bbox="1054 1765 2053 2190"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="2">Ordinary Least Squares</th> <th colspan="2">Fixed Effects</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><math>\tilde{y}</math></td> <td>1.158***</td> <td>(4.42)</td> <td>1.210***</td> <td>(5.78)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><math>\tilde{a}</math></td> <td>0.700***</td> <td>(-24.84)</td> <td>0.891***</td> <td>(-4.50)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><math>\tilde{T}</math></td> <td>0.339***</td> <td>(-14.18)</td> <td>0.467***</td> <td>(-11.31)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><math>\tilde{\Gamma}(\theta\sigma_y)</math></td> <td>1.598</td> <td>(0.93)</td> <td>2.006*</td> <td>(1.69)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><math>(T - t)\tilde{y}_p</math></td> <td>1.145*</td> <td>(1.83)</td> <td>1.277***</td> <td>(3.81)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tax cut dummy</td> <td>19.100***</td> <td>(5.10)</td> <td>19.780***</td> <td>(5.27)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tax increase dummy</td> <td>-25.660***</td> <td>(-9.52)</td> <td>-25.930***</td> <td>(-9.57)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lagged tax dummies</td> <td>YES</td> <td></td> <td>YES</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other controls</td> <td>YES</td> <td></td> <td>YES</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>t-statistics for coefficient equal to 1, *** p&lt;0.01, ** p&lt;0.05, * p&lt;0.10                  t-statistics for coefficient equal to 0, *** p&lt;0.01, ** p&lt;0.05, * p&lt;0.10</p>		Ordinary Least Squares		Fixed Effects		$\tilde{y}$	1.158***	(4.42)	1.210***	(5.78)	$\tilde{a}$	0.700***	(-24.84)	0.891***	(-4.50)	$\tilde{T}$	0.339***	(-14.18)	0.467***	(-11.31)	$\tilde{\Gamma}(\theta\sigma_y)$	1.598	(0.93)	2.006*	(1.69)	$(T - t)\tilde{y}_p$	1.145*	(1.83)	1.277***	(3.81)	Tax cut dummy	19.100***	(5.10)	19.780***	(5.27)	Tax increase dummy	-25.660***	(-9.52)	-25.930***	(-9.57)	Lagged tax dummies	YES		YES		Other controls	YES		YES	
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<h2>Nonparametric Analysis</h2> <p>Mean aggregate absolute deviation</p> $m_1 = \sum_{t=1}^T  c_t^*(w_t) - c_t $ <p>Mean utility loss</p> $m_2 = \sum_{t=1}^T [u(c_t^*(w_t^*)) - u(c_t)]$ <div data-bbox="79 2398 1008 2694"> <p>The left graph shows Mean utility loss, and the right graph shows Mean aggregate absolute deviation. Both metrics generally decrease over the 8 rounds. R2 consistently shows the highest values, while Ctrl and R1 are lower and relatively similar to each other.</p> </div>	<h2>Literature</h2> <p>Caballero, R. J. (1990): "Consumption Puzzles and Precautionary Savings," <i>Journal of Monetary Economics</i>, 25(1), 113–136.                  Caballero, R. J. (1991): "Earnings Uncertainty and Aggregate Wealth Accumulation," <i>The American Economic Review</i>, 81(4), 859–871.                  Carbone, E., and J. D. Hey (2004): "The Effect of Unemployment on Consumption: An Experimental Analysis," <i>The Economic Journal</i>, 114(497), 660–683.                  Fischbacher, U. (2007): "z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments," <i>Experimental Economics</i>, 10(2), 171–178.                  Seater, J. J. (1993): "Ricardian Equivalence," <i>Journal of Economic Literature</i>, 31(1), 142–190.                  Shapiro, M. D., and J. Slemrod (1995): "Consumer Response to the Timing of Income: Evidence from a Change in Tax Withholding," <i>American Economic Review</i>, 85(1), 274–83.</p>																																																		
<p><b>T. Meissner*</b>, <b>D. Rostam-Afschar</b><sup>2,3</sup>                  * <i>Technische Universität Berlin</i>, <sup>2</sup> <i>Freie Universität Berlin</i>, <sup>3</sup> <i>DIW Berlin</i></p>																																																			