

Literaturliste zu Veranstaltung „Ökonomische Theorie der Politik“

Zusammenstellung der Literatur für die einzelnen Kapitel der Vorlesung. Die hier genannten Quellen finden sich im **Handapparat des Lehrstuhls Berger** in der Wiwiss-Bibliothek bzw. ein Teil auch als **Download im Blackboard**.

Signatur	Autor	Titel, Auflage
Kapitel 1		
Xa 250 Magazin 1937 / A 3/5 Lesesaal	Frey, Bruno S. (1982)	"Wohlfahrtsökonomik III: Wahlverfahren", in: Willi Albers et al. (Hg.), <i>Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft</i> , Band 9, Fischer u.a.: Stuttgart, S. 494-502.
Xa 250 Magazin 1937 / A 3/5 Lesesaal	Külp, Bernhard (1982)	"Wohlfahrtsökonomik I: Grundlagen", in: Willi Albers et al. (Hg.), <i>Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft</i> , Band 9, Fischer u.a.: Stuttgart, S. 469-486.
Bd 362 Lesesaal	Varian, Hal R. (1992)	<i>Microeconomic Analysis</i> , W.W. Norton: New York, Kapitel 22.
Kapitel 2		
Xa 250 Magazin 1937 / A 3/5 Lesesaal	Frey, Bruno S. (1982)	"Wohlfahrtsökonomik III: Wahlverfahren", W. Albers et al. (Hrsg.), <i>Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft</i> , Band 9, S.494-502.
Ba 1913	Gravelle, H. und R. Rees (1992)	<i>Microeconomics</i> , 2 nd edition, Longman, London, S. 502-507.
Xa 10 /A3/10 Lesesaal	Moulin, H. und H.P. Young (1987)	"Condorcet", J. Eatwell et al. (Hrsg.), <i>New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics</i> , S. 566-567.
Da 275 Handapparat	Mueller, Dennis C. (1995)	<i>Public Choice II</i> , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Kapitel 20, S.179-185, S.65-66, S.196-198, S.199-203, S.82-94.
W2002/1207 Lesesaal	Rosen, Harvey S. (2002)	<i>Public Finance</i> , Irwin, Chicago, Kapitel 7, S. 119-125, S. 125-127, S. 127-129.
L 470/ D 751 (JFK)	Downs, Anthony (1957)	<i>An Economic Theory of Democracy</i> , Harper, Kapitel 8 (dt.: <i>Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie</i> , Mohr, Tübingen, 1968).
Bb 709 Lesesaal	Niehans, Jürg (1990)	<i>A History of Economic Theory</i> , Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, S. 333-341.
e-journals	Kirchgässner, G. (2000)	"Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result", <i>Public Choice</i> 103, S.35-48.
Nicht in Bibliothek	Tullock, Gordon (1998)	<i>On Voting</i> , Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Kapitel 7.
Kapitel 3		
	Alesina, Alberto und Howard Rosenthal (1995)	<i>Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy</i> , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Kapitel 2 – ohne 2.6.

L 470/ D 751 (JFK)	Downs, Anthony (1957)	<i>An Economic Theory of Democracy</i> , Harper, Kapitel 7 (dt.: <i>Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie</i> , Mohr, Tübingen, 1968).
Kapitel 4		
Da 389 Lesesaal	Blankart, Charles Beat (1994)	<i>Öffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie</i> , 2. völlig überarbeitete Auslage, München: Vahlen, 23. Kapitel, S. 220-227.
Db 816 Magazin	Brennan, Geoffrey and J.M. Buchanan (1980)	<i>The Power To Tax: Analytical Foundations of A Fiscal Constitution</i> , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Kapitel 2 & 3.
Z 81	Leibenstein, Harvey (1966)	„Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency“, <i>American Economic Review</i> 56, S. 392-415.
A 90/409	Moe, Terry M. (1990)	“The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy”, in: Oliver E. Williamson (Hg.), <i>Organization Theory</i> , Oxford University Press, NY, S. 116-153 (insb. S. 131 ff.).
Da 275 Handapparat	Mueller, Dennis C. (1989)	<i>Public Choice II</i> , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Kapitel 14.
L 545/N724 (JFK)	Niskanen, William A. (1971)	<i>Bureaucracy and Representative Government</i> , Aldine-Atherton, Chicago.
Z 29	Wyckoff, Paul Gary (1990)	“The Simple Analytics of Slack-maximizing Bureaucracy”, <i>Public Choice</i> 67, S. 35-47.
W2002/1207 Lesesaal	Rosen, Harvey S. (1995)	<i>Public Finance</i> , Irwin, Chicago, Kapitel 7, S. 134-137.
O 970/ W 2002/2177 Lesesaal	Wintrobe, Ronald (1997)	„Modern Bureaucratic Theory“, D.C. Mueller (Hrsg.), <i>Perspectives on Public Choice</i> , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, S. 429-454.
Kapitel 5		
Bga 1054 Magazin	Olson, Mancur (1982)	<i>The Rise and Decline of Nations, Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities</i> , Yale University Press, New Haven, Kapitel 2.
Br 7 (OSI)	Olson, Mancur (1965)	<i>The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups</i> , Harvard University Press, Cambridge (dt: <i>Die Logik des Kollektiven Handelns, Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen</i> , Tübingen, Mohr, 1968)
Za 2-588 Beschränkte Ausleihe	Paqué, Karl-Heinz (1993)	<i>How Clean Was the State? Some Notes on the Olesian View of the Postwar Economic Miracle</i> , Kieler Arbeitspapiere, 588
Internet	Figueiredo, John M. de und Brian S. Silverman (2002)	<i>Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying</i> , Working Paper 4245-02, MIT Sloan School of Management.
Da 275 Handapparat	Mueller, Dennis C. (1989)	<i>Public Choice II</i> , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Kapitel 13.
Z 29	Nitzan, Shmuel (1994)	"Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests", <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 10(1), S. 41-60.
ZV 63 (OSI)	Roberts, Brian E. (1990)	“A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits”, <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 34, 31-58.

In Wiwiss-bibl.	Tullock, Gordon (1975)	"The Transitional Gains Trap", <i>The Bell Journal of Economics</i> , 6(2), S. 671-78.
C 1/970	Epstein, David und Sharyn O'Halloran (1995)	A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy", <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i> , 11(2), S. 227-255
Ba 3604	Potters, J. und F. van Winden (1996)	Models of interest groups: four different approaches", in N. Schofield, Hg., <i>Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy</i> , Kluwer, Boston, S. 337-362 (insb. S. 350-356).
e-journals	Grossman, Gene M. und Elhanan Helpman (1999)	"Competing for Endorsments", <i>American Economic Review</i> , 89(3), 501-24.
Kapitel 6		
	Ashenfelter, Orley und Stanley Keller (1975)	„Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections“, <i>Journal of Law and Economics</i> 18, S. 695-733.
	Blais, André und Robert Young (1999)	„Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality“, <i>Public Choice</i> 99. S. 39-55.
	Dixit, Avinash K. und Barry J. Nalebuff (1991)	<i>Thinking Strategically</i> , Norton, New York, S. 259-264.
L 470/ D 751 (JFK)	Downs, Anthony (1957)	<i>An Economic Theory of Democracy</i> , Harper (dt.: <i>Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie</i> , Mohr, Tübingen, 1968).
	Kirchgässner, Gebhard und Jörg Schimmelpfennig (1992)	„Closeness Counts if It Matters for Electoral Victory: Some Empirical Results for the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany“, <i>Public Choice</i> 73, S. 283-299.
	Matsuka, John G. und Filip Palda (1993)	„The Downsian Voter Meets the Ecological Fallacy“, <i>Public Choice</i> 77, S. 855-878.
Da 275 Handapparat	Mueller, Dennis C. (1989)	<i>Public Choice II</i> , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Kapitel 18
internet	Sayantan Ghosal und Ben Lockwood (2003)	<i>Information Aggregation, Costly Voting and Common Values</i> , Warwick Economic Research Papers No. 670, Department of Economics, University of Warwick.
Z 81	Feddersen, Timothy J. and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996)	„The SwingVoter’s Curse“, <i>American Economic Review</i> 86, S. 408-424.
Z 29	Nannestad, Peter und Martin Paldam (1994)	“The VP-Function: a Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25Years”, <i>Public Choice</i> , 79 , S. 213-245
	Jeffrey Toobin	“The Great Election Grab” <i>The New Yorker</i> ; Dec. 8, 2003; p. 63-80
Kapitel 7		
	Dixit, Avinash und Barry Nalebuff (1991)	<i>Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life</i> , Norton, NY

Be 1291	North, Douglass C. und Barry R. Weingast (1994)	"Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England", in: Torsten Persson und Guido Tabellini (Hg.), <i>Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Volume 1: Credibility</i> , MIT Press, Cambridge, S. 311-43.
	Dixit, Avinash K. (1996),	<i>The Making of Economic Policy, A Transaction Cost Perspective</i> , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, S. 61-85.
Z 1410 Magazin	Berger, Helge, Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, and Jakob De Haan (2001),	Central Bank Independence: Update on Theory and Evidence, <i>Journal of Economic Surveys</i> , 15(1), pp. 3-40.
Z 92	Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott (1977),	"Rules rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans", <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 85, S. 473-91
Z 80	Rogoff, Kenneth (1985)	"The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target", <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 100(4), S. 1169-90.
Kapitel 8		
Nicht in Bib	Alesina, Alberto und Howard Rosenthal (1995)	<i>Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy</i> , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Kapitel 3.
Z 80	Persson, Torsten, Gérard Roland und Guido Tabellini (1997)	"Separation of Powers and Political Accountability", <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 112(4), S. 1163-1202.
Kapitel 9		
	Baumol, W.J. (1967)	Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis, <i>American Economic Review</i> , 57, S.415-426.
	Blankart, Charles (1994)	<i>Öffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie</i> , Vahlen: München, 2. Auflage, Kapitel 9.
	Peacock, A.T. und J. Wiseman (1961)	<i>The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom</i> , Allen & Unwin: London, Kapitel 2 & 3.
	Wildavsky, A. (1964)	<i>The Politics of the Budgetary Process</i> , Little Brown and Co: Boston. S. 102-123.
	Alesina, Alberto und Roberto Perotti (1995)	The Political Economy of Budget Deficits, <i>IMF Staff Papers</i> , 42(1), S. 1-31.
	Alesina, Alberto und Guido Tabellini (1990)	A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt, <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> 57, S. 403-414.
	Cukierman, Alex and Allan H. Meltzer (1989)	A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework, <i>American Economic Review</i> , 79, S. 713-732.
	Easterly, William (1998)	When Is Fiscal Adjustment an Illusion?, <i>Mimeo.</i> (http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/726.pdf)

Kapitel 10		
Nicht in Bibliothek	Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, Gerald D. Cohen (1997)	<i>Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy</i> , MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, Kapitel 2 & 3.
e-journals	Helge Berger und Ulrich Woitek (1996)	Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germany, <i>Public Choice</i> , 91(2), S. 179-97.
Z 29	Bruno S. Frey und Friedrich Schneider (1979)	An Econometric Model with An Endogenous Government Sector, <i>Public Choice</i> , 34, S. 29-43.
ZS 281-71 (OSI)	Hibbs, Douglas A. (1977)	Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 71, S. 1467-87.
Z 108	Nordhaus, William D. (1975)	The Political Business Cycle, <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 42, S. 169-90.
Z 108	Rogoff, Kenneth and Anne Sibert (1988)	Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles, <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 55, S. 1-16.
	Persson, Torsten und Guido Tabellini (1990)	<i>Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics</i> , Harwood, London, S. 66 ff. & Kapitel 5.
Kapitel 11		
	Dixit, Avinash und John Londregan (1995)	Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency, <i>American Political Science Review</i> 89, S. 856-66.
	Dixit, Avinash und John Londregan (1996)	The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics, <i>Journal of Politics</i> 58, S. 1132-55.
	Dixit, Avinash und John Londregan (1998)	Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics, <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> 113(2), S. 497-529.
	Lindert, Peter H. (1996)	What Limits Social Spending?, <i>Explorations in Economic History</i> , 33, 1-34.
	Persson, Torsten und Guido Tabellini (2000)	<i>Political Economics—Explaining Economic Policy</i> , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Kapitel 6.1.