Christian Basteck ist bis heute als Research Fellow am Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung Berlin (WZB) tätig. Zwischen 2016 und 2019 war er Forschungsbeauftragter am European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics der Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management der Université Libre de Bruxelles. Zuvor studierte er Mathematik und Wirtschaftswissenschaften an der Technischen Universität Berlin und hatte dort eine Stelle als Forschungs- und Lehrassistent am Lehrstuhl für Makroökonomie inne.

Lehrangebot im Wintersemester 2022-23:

• Mikroökonomie

• Mikroökonomische Analyse

•  Advanced Microeconomic Theory 

Forschungsschwerpunkte:

• Spieltheorie
• Sozialwahltheorie
• Markt- und Mechanismusdesign 

- “Characterizing Scoring Rules by their Solution in Iteratively Undominated Strategies,” Economic Theory, 2022

- “Aiding Applicants: Leveling the Playing Field within the Immediate Acceptance Mechanism,” Review of Economic Design, 2022, with Marco Mantovani

- “How lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, with Bettina Klaus and Dorothea Kübler

-“Fair Solutions to the Random Assignment Problem,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018 

-“Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, with Marco Mantovani 

-“Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, with Tijmen Daniëls and Frank Heinemann

-“Every Symmetric 3x3 Global Game of Strategic Complementarities has Noise Independent Selection,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, joint with Tijmen Daniëls 

Working Papers 

“Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment,” with Lars Ehlers – revise and resubmit at Journal of Economic Theory 

Abstract. We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envy-free and unanimous. Weakening the latter requirement to q-unanimity – i.e., when each agent ranks finds a different object most-preferred, then every agent shall receive their most-preferred object with probability of at least q – we show that a mechanism that satisfies strategy-proofness, envy-freeness and ex-post weak non-wastefulness can be q-unanimous only for q ≤ n2 (where n is the number of agents). To demonstrate that this bound is tight, we introduce a new mechanism, Random-Priority-cum-Equal-Division (RPcED), and show that it achieves this maximal bound when all objects are acceptable. In addition, for three agents, RPcED is characterized by the first three properties and ex-post weak efficiency. If objects may be unacceptable, strategy- proofness and envy-freeness are incompatible even with ex-post weak non-wastefulness. 

Sonstige Veröffentlichungen

“Matching Practices for Secondary Schools – Germany,” matching-in-practice.eu, 2015, joint with Katharina Huesmann and Heinrich Nax