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Publications

Helmut Bester

PUBLICATIONS IN JOURNALS

  • Wage Bargaining, Productivity Growth and Long-Run Industry Structure (with Chrysovalantou Milliou and Emmanuel Petrakis), forthcoming in Labour Economics.

  • Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information (with D. Krähmer), Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012),  1947-1968. , (forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory)

  • Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights, Economic Theory 41  (2009), 269 - 296.Delegation and Incentives (with D. Krähmer), Rand Journal of Economics 39 (2008), 664-682.

  • Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication, (with R. Strausz), Journal of Economic Theory 136 (2007), 236-259.
  • Delegation and Incentives (with D. Krähmer), Rand Journal of Economics 39 (2008), 664-682.
  • Conflict and the Social Contract (with K. Waerneryd), Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108, (2006), 231 -249.
  • Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict, (with K. Konrad), Journal of Theoretical Politics 17, (2005), 199-215.
  • Delay in Contests, (with K. Konrad),  European Economic Review 48, (2004), 1169-1178.
  • Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly, (with E. Petrakis), International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, (2004), 83-100.
  • Wages and Productivity Growth in a Competitive Industry, (with E. Petrakis), Journal of Economic Theory 109 (2003), 52-69.
  • Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case, (with R. Strausz), Econometrica 69, (2001),1077-1098.
  • Delegated Bargaining and Renegotiation (with J. Sakovics), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 45, (2001), 459-473.
  • Strategic Pricing, Signalling, and Information Acquisition, (with K. Ritzberger), International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 2001, 1347-1361.
  • Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Multi-Agent Case, (with R. Strausz), Economics Letters 69, (2000) , 165-171.
  • Informative Reklame (Informative Advertising), Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschafts und Sozialwissenschaften 118, (1998), 499-519.
  • Quality Uncertainty Mitigates Product Differentiation, Rand Journal of Economics 29, (1998), 828-844.
  • Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable?, (with Werner Gueth), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, (1998), 193-209.
  • Internal Finance versus Bank Debt: The Gains from Establishing a Debt History, (with Joris Scheepens), Kredit und Kapital 29, (1996), 565-591.
  • Coupons and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination, (with Emmanuel Petrakis), International Journal of Industrial Organization 14, (1996), 227-242.
  • A Non-Cooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game, (with  A. de Palma, W. Leininger, E.-L. von Thadden und J. Thomas), Games and Economic Behavior 12, (1996), 165-186.
  • Price Competition and Advertising in Oligopoly, (with Emmanuel Petrakis), European Economic Review 39, (1995), 1075-1088.
  • A Bargaining Model of Financial Intermediation, European Economic Review 39, (1995), 211-228.
  • Random Advertising and Monopolistic Price Dispersion, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 3,  (1994), 545-559.
  • Price Commitment in Search Markets,  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25, (1994), 109-120.
  • The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 26, (1994), 72-86.
  • The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry, (with Emmanuel Petrakis), International Journal of Industrial Organization 11, (1993), 519-534.
  • Bargaining vs. Price Competition in  Markets with Quality Uncertainty, American Economic Review 83, (1993), 278-288.
  • Bertrand Equilibrium in a Differentiated Duopoly, International Economic Review 33, (1992), 433-448.
  • Non-Cooperative Bargaining and Imperfect Competition: A Survey, Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 109, (1989), 265 -286.
  • Incentive Compatible Long-Term Contracts and Job Rationing, Journal of Labor Economics 7, (1989), 238-255.
  • Non - Cooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition, Econometrica 57, (1989), 97-113.
  • Qualitative Uncertainty in a Market with Bilateral Trading, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 90, (1988), 415-434.
  • Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions, Review of Economic Studies 55, (1988), 201-214.
  • The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, European Economic Review 31, (1987), 887-899.
  •  The Level of Investment in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 141, (1985), 503-515.
  • Screening versus Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review 75, (1985), 850-855.
  • Core and Equilibrium in Incomplete Markets, Journal of Economics 44, (1984), 255 - 266.
  • On Increasing Risk in Incomplete Markets, Economics Letters 16, (1984), 27 -30.
  • Increasing Risk and Equilibrium under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory 33, (1984), 378 - 386.
  • On Shareholder Unanimity in the Mean-Variance Model, Economics Letters 10, (1982), 363 - 367.
  • Der Umschlag fixen Kapitals im Marxschen Zwei - Abteilungen - Modell, Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik 195, (1980), 351-367.

 

BOOKS

  • Theorie der Industrieökonomik, Springer Lehrbuch, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg (1. Aufl. 2000, 2. Auflage 2002, 3. Auflage 2004).

 

CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOOKS AND COLLECTIVE VOLUMES

  • Die Anreizfunktion von Kreditverträgen bei unvollständiger Information, in: "Kapitalmarkt und Finanzierung", Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Neue Folge Band 165, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot (1987), 225 - 236.
  • Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues , (zus. mit Martin Hellwig), in:   "Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives" , G. Bamberg und K. Spreman (Eds.) , Berlin: Springer (1987), 135 - 167.
  • Credit Screening , in: “The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance” , London and Basingstoke: MacMillan (1992).
  • Spieltheorie, in: „Handwörterbuch Unternehmensführung und Organisation“, Georg Schreyögg und Axel v. Werder (Eds.) , Schäffer/Poeschel 2004, S. 1341-1349.
  • Specific Skills, Imperfect Information and Job Rationing, in: „Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour“, Steffen Huck (Ed.) , Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004, S. 73-84.
  • Industrieökonomie, in: „Handwörterbuch der Betriebswirtschaft”, Richard Köhler, Hans-Ulrich Küpper und Andreas Pfingsten (Hrsg.), Schäffer/Poeschel 2007, S. 714-722.

 

[RECENT DISCUSSION PAPERS]

 

 

Berlin Graduate School in Economics BDPEMS PhD Program in Economics
SFB TR 15