

**Rana Plaza as a Threat to the Fast Fashion Model? An Analysis of Institutional
Responses to the Disaster in Germany**

Nora Lohmeyer
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany

Elke Schüßler
Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria¹

Book chapter forthcoming in: Becker-Leifhold, C./Heuer, M. (ed.) *Eco Friendly and Fair: Fast Fashion and Consumer Behavior*. Sheffield, Greenleaf Publishing.

Acknowledgements

We thank the Volkswagen Foundation for providing funds for conducting this research in the context of the “Europe and Global Challenges” Program. We would also like to thank Julia Bartosch and Stephen Frenkel for useful comments on an earlier draft.

¹ Author names in alphabetical order.

Abstract

Based on an analysis of the main institutional responses to the Rana Plaza factory collapse in 2013, we find that the catastrophe produced institutional change in some areas, but has thus far failed to do so in others. We focus our analysis on Germany, which has significant garment import from Bangladesh. Specifically, we find that the majority of governance initiatives are production-oriented and not consumption-oriented. This means that they are mostly geared towards changing working conditions at supplier factories and not towards challenging the fast fashion business model and the related consumer behavior. By drawing on the 'focusing events' framework we outline the problem definition, policy templates, and actors behind the most important initiatives and are thereby able to offer explanations for this outcome. We conclude by outlining alternative consumption-oriented courses of action that could complement production-oriented initiatives.

The Rana Plaza factory collapse

On the 24th of April 2013, a nine-story garment factory in Sabhar, a city in the north-west of Dhaka, collapsed. More than 1100 workers died and more than 2400 people were injured. The collapse of the Rana Plaza building is one of the deadliest accidents in the history of the global garment industry, but sadly only one in a series of factory accidents in Bangladesh, Pakistan and other garment-producing countries.

The reasons for such accidents are manifold. Since the 1970s, when big retailers shifted most of their sourcing to Asia to realize rock-bottom prices through economies of scale and wage arbitrage, the garment industry has been subject to immense price competition. Together with a history of complicated customs and trade laws (Rivoli, 2005), this price competition has led to an ever-increasing complexity of global production networks (GPN).

These factors have been aggravated by the rise of the ‘fast fashion’ business model. Defined by the objective of getting fashionable, low cost clothing into stores “within the shortest time possible” (Bruce & Daly, 2006, p. 330; Cachon & Swinney, 2011), fast fashion – in addition to pressure on prices – intensifies time pressure and demands for high flexibility. These strains are passed on from lead firms to suppliers. Often understood as a “consumer-driven-approach” (Bhardwaj & Fairhurst, 2010; Barnes & Lea-Greenwood, 2006), fast fashion plays an important role in shaping the conditions for suppliers and their workers in the so-called Global South today. Empirical research shows that the characteristics of the fast fashion segment “create additional constraints on supplier firms and workers and circumscribe social upgrading prospects” (Plank, Rossi, & Staritz, 2012, p. 15). Taplin (2014) directly holds fast fashion consumption responsible for disasters like Rana Plaza.

Despite longstanding efforts to integrate consumers more meaningfully into industrial relations research (Heery, 1993; Frenkel, Korczynski, Shire, & Tam, 1999), consumers are

still often ignored as an industrial relations actor (Kessler & Bach, 2011, p. 81). This is surprising given that consumer-driven social movements can play an important role in pressurizing lead firms towards more ethical behavior (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015). Donaghey and colleagues (2014, p. 230) “argue for the need to focus on the consumer who, despite being a postproduction actor outside of the employment contract, has become an important driver of private labor governance.” Global supply chains in the garment industry are buyer-driven (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005), and it has been argued that initiatives for change should focus less on the supplier and more on the buyer side (Anner, Bair, & Blais, 2013), i.e. on the interface at the point of consumption where reputational damage is a strong concern. Against the background of the decreasing role of union membership and density in many countries, and the inability of states to regulate working standards, consumer campaigns might be an effective means to drive a stronger regulation of global supply chains (O’Rourke, 2011).

While consumer-driven initiatives have contributed to the formation of the Accord for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015), for example, it is surprising to see few institutional initiatives that target consumer behavior as an outcome, for instance through greater transparency about production conditions and the detrimental effects of fast fashion consumption. Even though consumers should not be made responsible for labor standards violations, consumers can be an important driver of social change, either through anti-consumption or through forging new forms of consumption (Hartl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2016). To date, however, the most significant responses to the Rana Plaza disaster were initiatives targeting a change in production conditions, such as building and fire safety standards, and not a change in consumer behavior and the fast fashion business model.

In the following chapter, in order to shed light on the emergence of the aforementioned imbalance, we will outline the main institutional responses to the Rana Plaza

disaster from the perspective of Germany, a core importer of ready-made garments from Bangladesh. We will examine the focus of these initiatives, i.e. whether they focus on changing the behavior of producers or consumers, as well as the actors and politics behind them. Thus, we go beyond the distinction between production and consumption-based mobilization strategies (Donaghey, Reinecke, Niforou, & Lawson, 2014; Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015, 2016) towards distinguishing whether labor governance approaches in global garment supply chains are production or consumption-oriented. Whereas the former pays attention to the actor constellations pushing for change in labor standards governance (e.g. labor actors vs. consumers and NGOs), we are looking at whether governance initiatives aim at changes in the production or the consumption side of the supply chain, that is, whether they are geared towards changing working conditions at supplier factories or challenging the fast fashion model and the related consumer behavior. With regards to the latter, lead firms play a somewhat intermediary role, because they can either be targeted by initiatives in their role as buyers and coordinators of GPN (i.e. as involved in the production side, e.g. by providing suppliers with a list of acceptable chemical inputs into production processes), or as powerful market actors with the capacity to influence consumption practices (e.g. through their business models).

Rana Plaza as a focusing event

The field-changing dynamic of so-called ‘focusing events,’ such as environmental disasters, terrorist attacks, or industrial catastrophes, has often been highlighted (Birkland, 1997, 2004; Albright, 2011). A focusing event is commonly defined as

an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or suggests potential harms that are or could be concentrated on a definable geographic area or

community of interest, and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously. (Birkland, 1997, p. 22)

Focusing events – due to these characteristics – can promote certain policy agendas and potentially lead to institutional change.

Focusing events allow for change to occur, as they might lead to the convergence of already existing “streams” of problems, policies, and politics (Kingdon, 1995). That is, due to a specific event, certain problems become salient and accepted by policy makers, might be matched with policy ideas, and gain political momentum. For change to happen, all three streams – problems, solutions/policies, and politics – need to be combined, a task that requires so-called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Mucciaroni, 1992, p. 460-461) such as governmental bodies, NGOs, unions, associations and other actors or coalitions of these actors (Albright, 2011). However, the outcome of this policy process might vary, depending on different representations of the three streams (Farley et al., 2007). Without doubt, the Rana Plaza disaster can be interpreted as a focusing event, and our aim in this chapter is to look more closely at the nature of the German policy outcomes that have ensued from it so far.

Methods

Our analysis is based on a series of 25 expert interviews with representatives from business associations, policy makers, unions, NGOs, investors, and consultants conducted between 2013 and 2017. The interviews are combined with insights gained from our ongoing research of the garment industry in Germany and other countries (www.garmentgov.de), which includes attendance at several industry events.

Based on our research, we have identified five main policy responses to the Rana Plaza disaster in Germany: the German Partnership for Sustainable Textiles (Textile Partnership), the Garment Industries Transparency Initiative (GITI), efforts to develop an

employment injury protection scheme (EIPS) for Bangladeshi garment workers, initiatives focusing on sustainable public procurement, as well as the online platform textilklarheit.de.²

We classify these initiatives as either production-oriented or consumption-oriented (see Table 1) based on where they seek to effect changes.

Table 1

Definitions of core concepts

<i>Production-oriented</i>	<i>Consumption-oriented</i>
Initiatives that aim to effect changes in supplier practices either directly, e.g. through local capacity building or funds for improvement, e.g., fire and building safety, or indirectly, by making lead firms more accountable for supplier practices (e.g. sustainable reporting initiatives)	Initiatives that aim to effect changes in the behavior of end consumers and public buyers, e.g. through information about the detrimental effects of fast fashion or public procurement policies, as well as initiatives that aim to change organizational buyers' business models towards more sustainable consumption practices

Using the focusing events framework we analyze the problem (how is the problem defined?), policy (which policy templates are used?) and political (which actors are involved?) streams related to these initiatives and therewith explain why Rana Plaza has led to substantial institutional changes with regards to the production side, but has failed to address equally important issues, such as consumption behavior and the logic of fast fashion.

Findings

In Germany, as in many industrialized countries, Rana Plaza has opened a “policy window” (Birkland, 2004, p. 181) and led to a variety of initiatives. Guided by the focusing event framework, we provide an overview about the initiatives that followed from Rana

² German actors such as the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) or the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) are involved in numerous other initiatives in Bangladesh and other developing countries. We did not include these initiatives in our analysis as they have a broader development policy orientation and/or are typically not direct responses to the Rana Plaza disaster.

Plaza. Hereby, we show that the initiatives mainly focus on the production and not on the consumption side. Table 2 summarizes our findings, which we will outline in more detail below.

Table 2

Analysis of the German responses to Rana Plaza

Initiative	Problem stream – problem definition	Policy stream – existing templates	Political stream – involved actors
Textile Partnership	Production-oriented (buyers and suppliers)	Existing standards and existing firm-level initiatives	BMZ and lead firms experienced in multi-stakeholder initiatives
Garment Industries Transparency Initiative (GITI)	Production-oriented (suppliers)	Existing initiative (ETI)	Industry experts and lead firms
Employment injury protection scheme (EPIS)	Production-oriented (suppliers)	Existing accident insurance system (from Germany)	DGUV, ILO, BMZ
Public procurement	Consumption-oriented (buyers)	Existing platform (kompass-nachhaltigkeit.de)	NGOs focusing on confrontation, rather than cooperation, GIZ, Engagement Global, BMZ
Textilklarheit.de	Consumption-oriented (end consumers)	Existing platform (siegelklarheit.de)	BMZ, GIZ

One of the most notable initiatives is the *German Partnership for Sustainable Textiles*. The goal of the Textile Partnership is to improve the social, environmental, and economic conditions along global garment supply chains (Textile Partnership, 2017; for a detailed discussion, see Jastram & Schneider, 2015). This partnership was initiated by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in October 2014 and – as a

multi-stakeholder-initiative – now comprises a variety of actors from garment retailers, government, standard-setting organizations, NGOs and unions. Following already existing standards, the members jointly developed an action plan, committing themselves to improve social and environmental conditions, such as wages or the use of hazardous chemicals, at their supplier sites. Consumer behavior or the member firm’s business models are not addressed by this initiative, even though the Textile Partnership consistently emphasizes the focus on the whole supply chain, “from raw material production to disposal” (BMZ, 2016, p. 10),³ thereby (potentially) addressing consumers. Moreover, one of the stated means towards sustainable supply chains is “transparent communication, which allows consumers to easily identify sustainable textiles” (Textile Partnership, 2015, p. 5, 2017, p. 2). However, no explicit measures to address the consumer or the fast fashion model more generally have been taken by this initiative so far.

A second response to Rana Plaza in Germany was the launch of the *Garment Industries Transparency Initiative (GITI)*. GITI was founded in early 2014 as part of the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform, with financial support from several lead German firms (GITI, 2015, p. 1, 2016, p. 3). Very similar to the Textile Partnership, GITI’s goal is to promote transparency and improve working conditions in the global garment industry and, in order to realize these goals, build on a “joint approach of governments, companies, civil society and trade unions in both producing and consuming countries” (GITI, 2015, p. 1, 2016). This policy approach was already successfully realized by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Like the Textile Partnership, consumers are not directly addressed by GITI – neither as part of the problem, nor the solution (GITI, 2016, p. 4). This seems surprising as transparency is given center stage by this initiative –not least through its name – which is usually understood as an enabler for ethical consumption decisions. In the

³ All translations of quotes from German documents are the author’s own.

case of GITI, though, transparency is exclusively addressed with regards to actors like governments, buyers, unions, suppliers, and NGOs. It is intended to help these actors get an overview of supply chains in order to help them improve labor standards, but not as a means of providing consumers with more information for making ethical consumption decisions. This is further underlined in the initiatives' problem definition:

Complex and often obscure supply chains are an underlying factor for many labour standard implementation failures. For example, the working conditions at subcontracted, unauthorized factories are generally worse than in listed factories. Unauthorized factories do not receive attention by brands or multi-stakeholder initiatives and the risk of accidents is higher. (GITI, 2016, p. 6)

Third, in a collaborative effort, the German Social Accident Insurance (Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung, DGUV), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the BMZ (carried out by the German Society for International Cooperation, GIZ) work towards the implementation of a public *employment injury protection scheme* (EPIS) for Bangladeshi garment workers since December 2014. The idea is to transfer the public German accident insurance system, which combines the elements of accident prevention, medical and professional rehabilitation as well as financial compensation. The initiative involves a close exchange and collaboration – for instance through visits and joint conferences – between labor, industry, and government representatives from Bangladesh and Germany. The EPIS is envisioned to prevent accidents like the Rana Plaza factory collapse through at least two avenues. First, employers will have an incentive to invest more in occupational health and safety and rehabilitation, since the protection scheme is primarily financed by employers themselves. Second, and through its emphasis on social dialogue (i.e. deliberation between employers and employees), it is expected that more effective accident prevention measures (e.g. through occupational health and safety initiatives) will be developed. With its strong

focus on the Bangladeshi garment sector, this initiative is exclusively focused on the production site.

Furthermore, new emphasis has been placed on *sustainable public procurement* after the factory collapse of Rana Plaza. Since 2014, a new EU directive on public procurement (2014/24/EU) and the revised Restriction of Competition Act allow for the consideration of social and environmental criteria in public procurement decisions. Since the directives' implementation in Germany on 18 April 2016, public institutions can require social and/or environmental criteria in their public tenders. This initiative expands the platform 'kompass-nachhaltigkeit.de' ('sustainability compass') which was founded in 2010 on behalf of the BMZ and implemented by the GIZ and Engagement Global (with its Service Agency Communities in One World) to inform and assist procurers at all administrative levels to take social and environmental concerns in public procurement more into account (GIZ, 2016, p. 1). Since 2014 the platform also addresses the municipal level and provides information on the legal requirements specific to federal states (ibid.). Similarly, Femnet (a German women's rights organization that has been working on the issue of working conditions in the global garment industry since 2010) together with the city administration of Bonn and supported by Engagement Global and the BMZ were working on a procurement policy too (Burckhardt, 2017). In August 2015 they launched the first steps for a fair public procurement campaign and since then have been assisting and advising procurement managers in strengthening social criteria in the public purchasing of professional clothing. Moreover, from 2017 on, the above-mentioned Textile Partnership has committed to working on fair public procurement as well (Femnet & Eine Welt Bonn, 2017, p. 6). Finally, the federal government foresees that 50% of the textiles for the Federal Administration will be procured according to ecological and social criteria by 2020 (BMZ, 2014). Although this initiative addresses the consumption side of the supply chain, and thus differs from the initiatives

discussed before, end consumers are not directly addressed by this initiative, nor does this initiative affect the frontrunner firms of the German fast fashion industry.

The online platform *textilklarheit.de* ('textile-transparency') is one notable exception among the variety of responses to the Rana Plaza disaster in Germany, as it directly addresses consumers, aiming to assist them in making sustainable consumption decisions. The platform was initiated and funded by the BMZ in cooperation with the GIZ in February 2015 as part of the already existing platform *siegelklarheit.de* ('label-transparency'). By creating awareness and assisting consumers and other actors to better understand environmental and social standards and fair-trade as well as environmental labels, the platform aims to drive the market penetration of sophisticated labels and the international implementation of high environmental and social standards in the garment industry. In early 2017, *siegelklarheit.de* has been promoted through an advertising campaign, a website (*vero-selvie.de*) and an ad shown in German cinemas, addressing (young) consumers in Germany and promoting fair fashion as a "trend." Although this campaign directly connects the working conditions of garment workers (Selvie) with the consumption behavior of German consumers (Vero) for the first time, it seems to be primarily concerned with promoting the engagement of the Textile Partnership's members, rather than problematizing their role and business models.

Discussion

Consumption models of Western consumers, including fast fashion, have been identified as part of the problem (Barnes & Lea-Greenwood, 2006; Taplin, 2014) and consequently consumers have come to the fore as important actors in global garment production networks (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2016). Nevertheless, our analysis shows that so far consumers and the fast fashion business model have only played a small role in post-Rana Plaza changes in Germany.

The focusing event framework tells us that for change to follow from a specific event, the problem, policy, and political streams need to converge (Birkland, 2004; Farley et al., 2007). Whereas all the above-mentioned initiatives were made possible or significantly strengthened by the severity of Rana Plaza as a focusing event and the ensuing media attention on the working conditions of garment workers, their foci might be explained by the specific constellation of, first, the predominant problem definition following the factory collapse, second, the previously available policy models, and, third, the existence of legitimate policy entrepreneurs (Mucciaroni, 1992) or policy entrepreneur coalitions (Albright, 2011), willing and able to act.

Due to the actors and policy proposals available, the Rana Plaza disaster was mainly interpreted in Germany as a *problem* related to the place of production. This might be due to the obvious violations of building standards at the Rana Plaza factory complex, as well as a problem stemming from the pressure exerted on suppliers by Western buyers. As a result, many institutional responses primarily focused on the production side, leaving the fast fashion model with its heightened pressure on prices, lead times, and flexibility factors into production conditions mostly untouched.

Several political dynamics might explain this outcome. First, although the Rana Plaza disaster “threw open the window of opportunity for policy change,” the actual policies were largely based on preexisting *policy templates* (Birkland, 2004, p. 179). For some initiatives, such as the Textile Partnership and GITI, consistency with existing standards and policies was even formulated as a goal (BMZ, 2014; GITI, 2016). GITI, for instance, explicitly underlines its “support of existing initiatives,” writing: “The GITI does not stand in competition to existing initiatives, but will build on and support current efforts that seek to foster sustainable practices in the garment sector” (GITI, 2016, p. 4). In the case of GITI and the Textile Partnership, these existing standards were all production-oriented, like the ILO

core labor standards, the OECD guidelines and the UN guiding principles. That is, although the Rana Plaza disaster allowed for a renewed, and in parts more ambitious, emphasis on the topic of labor standards, policy *innovations* following from this event were limited. Rather the already existing production-orientation was continued and even strengthened.

Second, and related to first, the specific *actor constellation* pushing the topic during the post-Rana Plaza period in Germany can explain the focus on production rather than consumption-oriented initiatives. The leading actor in most of the initiatives was the BMZ, supported by the GIZ, both of which are focused on development policy. One might thus assume that the Textile Partnership's focus might well have been different if the Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection would have been part of the post-Rana Plaza policy coalition. In line with this observation, the involved actors' experiences were much more pronounced with regards to production-oriented than consumption-oriented initiatives. In case of the GIZ, for instance, this experience even existed with regards to specific types of initiatives, as the GIZ has been involved in developing the (production-oriented) Accord (cf. Reinecke & Donaghey, 2016). Furthermore, the focus on the production rather than the consumption-side might be a result of the international orientation of the actors involved in these initiatives (especially the Textile Partnership and GITI). In the case of the Textile Partnership, this has been underlined by the actors themselves: "From the outset, the international focus [of the Textile Partnership] was set up due to the participation of international firms." (BMZ & BMAS, 2015, p. 10) In other initiatives, such as the EIPS, international organizations, such as the ILO, were playing an even more pronounced, coordinating role.

In contrast, consumption-oriented actors and initiatives focusing on the garment industry are rare in Germany and, if existent, focus on different aspects. The publicly funded consumer advice center ('Verbraucherzentrale'), for instance, focuses more on consumer

protection rather than on changing consumer behavior. Likewise, NGOs in this field are rare and have, so far, been focusing on campaigning against poor working conditions (e.g. with flash mobs in front of retail shops or ad-busting campaigns) rather than on cooperation. NGOs could, thus, not draw on established relations to firms and policy actors. To date, they were unable to create powerful coalitions for change in consumer behavior or the fast fashion model of German garment retailers and brands more broadly. In line with this argument, the engagement of the German-based NGO Femnet, supporting sustainable public procurement, is rather new and innovative and can probably be explained by the NGO's active participation in the Textile Partnership (not least in the steering committee). To our knowledge, this situation is similar in other countries, but a more systematic evaluation of production versus consumption-oriented initiatives in countries would be a fruitful avenue for further research.

Conclusion

In this chapter we argued that changing consumption behavior or firms' business models was not a focus of most German policy responses to the Rana Plaza disaster. Three out of five German attempts to prevent future accidents and improve working conditions in global garment supply chains were focused on the production side of the supply chain, i.e. on Bangladeshi garment factories. One initiative was focused on buyers, specifically public procurement, and one on providing transparency for end consumers. This imbalance is surprising given that fast fashion and the underlying consumer behavior are seen as part of the problem when it comes to working conditions in garment supply chains. Drawing on the focusing event framework, we argued that this imbalance can be explained partly by the predominant problem interpretation as production-based. More importantly, it can be explained by the pre-existing policy proposals and initiatives that geared new initiatives towards the pre-existing production-oriented "template," as well as by the focal actors

involved, which primarily acted on their international, production-oriented experiences and along their original functions. Thus, some degree of institutional path dependence might contribute to the ongoing lack of effective governance instruments regarding an improvement of labor standards in GPN.

Among the two consumption-oriented initiatives we identified, the public procurement initiative seems particularly promising. Compared to individual consumption, public procurement can unfold greater leverage, because the buying behavior of public institutions (e.g. cities, states or universities) is more stable and can be controlled by longer-term policy decisions (Esbenshade, 2012; Wetterberg, 2010). The initiative focusing on the end-consumer (textilklarheit.de), however, remains in the confines of information-led ethical consumerism and neglects more political forms of consumer mobilization (Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, & Malpass, 2005). This contrasts with production-oriented initiatives that draw on a variety of concrete measures, ranging from social dialogue (GITI, EIPS) to financial incentives (EIPS). Given their rarity and limited enforcement mechanism it is questionable whether extant consumption-oriented initiatives bear the potential to push for the systemic momentum that is needed to transform the behavior of end consumers in the West.

As a way forward, we not only need more consumption-oriented initiatives, but also initiatives which are more creative and political in nature. Instead of just passively providing information for which consumers need to proactively search, the information-led approach taken in Germany could, first, involve more active forms of transmitting information via awareness-raising campaigns, e.g. promoting trends for slow fashion (Pookulangara & Shephard, 2013), or educational activities including providing negative information and preventing misinformation, like greenwashing and forms of misleading marketing. Second, consumption-oriented activities could go well beyond informational and educational approaches, including more concrete and more political aspects such as providing financial

incentives to consume socially and environmentally sustainable (e.g. through taxes), supporting the ‘politicization’ of consumers through support for campaigns and organizations or promoting volunteering, demonstrating, boycotting or lobbying activities. Such approaches draw on a “repertoire of political action” and go beyond appeals to ethical consumerism, which remain within the confines of consumption, materialism, and individualism (Barnett et al., 2005, p. 46).

Against the background of the “systemic risks” that are attached to global supply chains (WEF, 2015), most likely a combination of production- and consumption-oriented initiatives will be most effective in enabling the structural transformation that is needed to address these risks. Neither the consumption-oriented nor the production-oriented approaches outlined above are mutually exclusive, rather they can be expected to unfold their capacity in a complementary manner (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015; Barnett et al., 2005). Fashion designers are beginning to recognize that sustainability starts with the conception of a product, and not with its production. What is needed though is an acknowledgement of the important role of consumers as industrial relations actors (see also Heery, 1993; Kessler & Bach, 2011) – not as a culprit to blame, but as a potential driver for social change.

References

- Albright, E.A. (2011). Policy change and learning in response to extreme flood events in Hungary: an advocacy coalition approach. *Policy Studies Journal*, 39(3), 485-511.
- Anner, M., Bair, J., & Blais, J. (2013). Toward joint liability in global supply chains: Addressing the root causes of labor violations in international subcontracting networks. *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal*, 35(1), 1-44.
- Bansal, P., & Roth, K. (2000). Why companies go green: A model of ecological responsiveness. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(4), 717-736.
- Barnes, L., & Lea-Greenwood, G. (2006). Fast fashioning the supply chain: shaping the research agenda. *Journal of Fashion Marketing and Management: An International Journal*, 10(3), 259-271.
- Barnett, C., Clarke, N., Cloke, P., & Malpass, A. (2005). The political ethics of consumerism. *Consumer Policy Review*, 15(2), 45-51.
- Bhardwaj, V., & Fairhurst, A. (2010). Fast fashion: response to changes in the fashion industry. *The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research*, 20(1), 165-173.
- Birkland, T.A. (1997): *After disaster: Agenda setting, public policy, and focusing events*. Georgetown: University Press.
- Birkland, T.A. (2004). "The World Changed Today": Agenda Setting and Policy Change in the Wake of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks. *Review of Policy Research*, 21(2), 179-200.
- BMZ (2016). *Gemeinsame Fortschritte im Textilsektor – Bündnis für nachhaltige Textilien*. Berlin.
- BMZ (2014). *Nachhaltige Textilien – was tut die deutsche Entwicklungspolitik*. Berlin.

- BMZ & BMAS (2015). Gute Arbeit weltweit. Zukunftspapier. Berlin.
- Bruce, M., & Daly, L. (2006). Buyer behaviour for fast fashion. *Journal of Fashion Marketing and Management: An International Journal*, 10(3), 329-344.
- Burckhardt, G. (2017). CSR in Mode: Ein kritischer Blick auf die Bekleidungsindustrie und FEMNETs Einsatz für bessere Arbeitsbedingungen. In P. Bungard & R. Schmidpeter (Eds.), *CSR in Nordrhein-Westfalen* (pp. 407-422). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
- Cachon, G.P., & Swinney, R. (2011). The value of fast fashion: Quick response, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior. *Management Science*, 57(4), 778-795.
- Donaghey, J., Reinecke, J., Niforou, C., & Lawson, B. (2014). From employment relations to consumption relations: Balancing labor governance in global supply chains. *Human Resource Management*, 53(2), 229-252.
- Esbenshade, J. (2012). A review of private regulation: Codes and monitoring in the apparel industry. *Sociology Compass*, 6(7), 541-556.
- Farley, J., Baker, D., Batker, D., Koliba, C., Matteson, R., Mills, R., & Pittman, J. (2007). Opening the policy window for ecological economics: Katrina as a focusing event. *Ecological Economics*, 63(2), 344-354.
- Femnet & Eine Welt Bonn (2017). Schritt für Schritt. Ihr Weg zur fairen öffentlichen Beschaffung von Dienst- und Schutzkleidung. Redaktion: Marie-Luise Lämmle, Kristina Klecko, Bonn.
- Frenkel, S., Korczynski, M., Shire, K., & Tam, M. (1999). *On the front line. Organization of work in the information economy*. Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press.
- Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., & Sturgeon, T. (2005). The Governance of Global Value Chains. *Review of International Political Economy*, 12(1), 78-104.
- GITI (2015). *The Garment Industries Transparency Initiative (GITI) – At a Glance*. Retrieved from <http://www.governance-platform.org>.

- GITI (2016). *The Garment Industries Transparency Initiative 2014-2016*. Retrieved from <http://www.governance-platform.org>.
- GIZ (2015). *Über den Kompass Nachhaltigkeit*. Retrieved from <http://oeffentlichebeschaffung.kompass-nachhaltigkeit.de/site/ueber-den-kompass/>.
- Hartl, B., Hofmann, E., & Kirchler, E. (2016). Do we need rules for “what's mine is yours”? Governance in collaborative consumption communities. *Journal of Business Research*, 69(8), 2756-2763.
- Heery, E. (1993). Industrial relations and the customer. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 24(4), 284-295.
- Jastram, S., & Schneider, A.M. (2015). Sustainable fashion governance at the example of the partnership for sustainable textiles. *uwf UmweltWirtschaftsForum*, 23(4), 205-212.
- Kessler, I., & Bach, S. (2011). The citizen-consumer as industrial relations actor: New ways of working and the end-user in social care. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 49(1), 80-102.
- Kim, J.K., Shaor-Ghaffari, P., & Gustainis, J.J. (1990). Agenda-setting functions of a mass event: The Case of “Amerika.” *Political Communication and Persuasion*, 7(1), 1-10.
- Kingdon, J.W. (1995). *Agendas, alternatives and public policies*. New York: Harper Collins.
- O'Rourke, D. (2011). *Citizen Consumer*. Boston Review. Retrieved from <http://bostonreview.net/novemberdecember-2011>.
- Plank, L., Rossi, A., & Staritz, C. (2012). Workers and social upgrading in “fast fashion”: The case of the apparel industry in Morocco and Romania. *ÖFSE-Österreichische Forschungsstiftung für Internationale Entwicklung, Working Paper 33*, 1-26.
- Pookulangara, S., & Shephard, A. (2013). Slow fashion movement: Understanding consumer perceptions – An exploratory study. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 20(2), 200-206.

- Locke, R. (2013). *The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mucciaroni, G. (1992). The garbage can model & the study of policy making: A critique. *Polity*, 24(3), 459-482.
- Reinecke, J., & Donaghey, J. (2016). The 'Accord for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh' in response to the Rana Plaza disaster. In A. Marx, G. Rayp, L. Beke, & J. Wouters (Eds.), *Global Governance of Labor Rights. Assessing the Effectiveness of Transnational Public and Private Policy Initiatives* (pp. 247-277). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Reinecke, J., & Donaghey, J. (2015). After Rana Plaza: Building coalitional power for labour rights between unions and (consumption-based) social movement organisations. *Organization*, 22(5), 720-740.
- Rivoli, F. (2005). *The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Seidman, G. (2007). *Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Transnational Activism*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Taplin, I. (2014). Who is to blame? A re-examination of fast fashion after the 2013 factory disaster in Bangladesh. *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, 10(1/2), 72-83.
- WEF (2015). Beyond supply chains. Empowering responsible value chains. Prepared in collaboration with Accenture, REF 070115.
- Wetterberg, A. 2010. Harder Soft Law: Private Labor Standards in Socially Regulated Markets. Atlanta, Georgia: American Sociological Association.